Why Indians Love Govt Jobs

jobs
Indian Railways, the country’s largest employer, recently advertised for 90,000 vacancies. It got over 2.8 crore applications for it.

My calculations suggest that the number of applicants is around one-fifth of India’s youth workforce, which is actually looking for a job.

Nearly two lakh people applied for 1,137 constable vacancies in Mumbai Police. A newsreport suggests that this included 167 MBAs, 423 Engineers and 543 postgraduates. There were 3 individuals with an LLB and 167 individuals with a Bachelors in Business Administration, on the list.

Sometime back,129 engineers, 23 lawyers, a chartered accountant and 393 postgraduates in arts, were among the 12,453 individuals who were interviewed for the job of a peon, in the Rajasthan Assembly Secretariat. In total, 18 posts were to be filled up.

In May last year, nearly 25 lakh individuals wrote the exam for 6,000 Group D posts on offer in the West Bengal government.

There are many other such examples, which have been popping up over the last few years. The moment a government job is advertised, a huge number of people apply for it. The question is why?

India is currently going through a phase, where its working age population is growing at a faster rate than the overall population. This is thanks to the fact that people are having fewer children. Nearly a million Indians are entering the workforce every month. This amounts to nearly 1.2 crore a year, or around two and a half times the population of New Zealand.

This stage in any economy is referred to as the demographic dividend. As people enter the workforce and find jobs, earn and spend, the economy grows at a faster rate than it has in the past, and pulls many people out of poverty.

Of course, this is how things are supposed to happen, in theory.

The fact that so many people are applying for government jobs suggests that there are not enough jobs going around for India’s demographic dividend. This is countered by the idea that not everyone applying for a government job is unemployed.

It is just that we Indians love the security of a government job and hence, the huge number of applicants.

Is that true?

India’s unemployment is best represented by the term underemployment. What does this mean? It means that everyone who is looking for work all through the year, does not find it.

Data from Annual Report on the Employment and Unemployment Survey suggests that only three in five Indians looking for a job all through the year are able to find it. This basically means that 40% of India’s workforce is unable to find work all through the year. We may call this underemployment, but this is nothing but unemployment.

Further, there is a huge amount of disguised unemployment in India’s agriculture sector, which produces around 12% of the gross domestic product, but employs nearly 46% of the workforce. Disguised unemployment essentially means that there are way too many people trying to make a living out of agriculture. On the face of it, they seem employed. Nevertheless, their employment is not wholly productive, given that agricultural production would not suffer even if some of these employed people stopped working.

A bulk of the Indian workforce is employed in the informal sector. Estimates vary from anywhere between 65% to 92%. And these individuals are badly paid. This is something that the government acknowledges as well. As the Economic Survey of 2015-2016 points out: “The informal sector should… be credited with creating jobs and keeping unemployment low. Yet, by most measures, informal sector jobs are much worse than formal sector ones—wages are, on average, more than 20 times higher in the formal sector.”

The point being that informal employment pays badly. The average daily earnings of a casual worker in rural areas in 2011-2012 was Rs 138. In urban areas, it was Rs 173. A regular worker made Rs 298 in rural areas and Rs 445 in urban areas. Now compare this with a worker of a central public sector enterprise, who made Rs 2,005 per day, apart from having a secure job and several other benefits. This basically means that a casual worker working in rural areas made around 6.9 per cent per day of what the worker of a CPSE made in 2011-2012.

There is no reason to believe that this would have changed by now. This clearly explains why Indians love government jobs. It takes away the insecurity of working for the informal sector and at the same time pays much better. Who wouldn’t apply for a government job in such a case?

Let’s look at a little more recent data.

As the Report of the Seventh Pay Commission, released in November 2015, points out: “To obtain a comparative picture of the salaries paid by the government with that in the private sector enterprises, the Commission engaged the Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad, to conduct a study. According to the study, the total [monthly] emoluments of a General Helper, who is the lowest ranked employee in the government, is Rs. 22,579, [which is] more than two times the emoluments of a General Helper in the private sector organisations surveyed, at Rs. 8,000-9,500.”

Hence, the IIM Ahmedabad study, “on comparing job families between the government and [the] private/public sector, has brought out the fact that… at lower levels, salaries are much lower in the private sector as compared to government jobs”.

As per the Report on the Employment and Unemployment Survey, nearly two-thirds of self-employed and contract workers, make up to Rs 7,500 per month or Rs 90,000 per year. The per capita income in 2015-2016, for which the above data is valid, was at Rs 1.07 lakh. This basically means that a bulk of India’s non-salaried workforce, earns a significantly lower income than the per capita income.

As far as the salaried workforce is concerned, around 38% of them make up to Rs 7,500 per month. Hence, the salaried part of the workforce is in a much better position. This clearly shows that there is an economic incentive for even the educated lot to apply for low-level government jobs.

India’s underemployment problem can be solved with more job creation in the formal sector, which isn’t happening. As per the Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy, in 2017-2018, Indian companies scrapped projects worth $ 117 billion, which is the highest number ever. 40% of these projects were dropped in the period January to March 2018.

In such a situation, how will formal jobs ever be created?

The Economic Survey summarises it best: “The challenge of creating ‘good jobs’ in India could be seen as the challenge of creating more formal sector jobs.”

The column originally appeared on Firstpost on April 24, 2018.

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18,000 Employees of Air India Cannot Hold the Nation to Ransom

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Newsreports suggest that 11 Air India unions representing more than 10,000 employees have started a social media campaign with the Save Air India slogan.

The Indian government plans to sell 76% of its stake in the airline. Under the current terms, the buyer needs to give a guarantee that the permanent employees of the airline will not be fired for at least one year.

After that the buyer is allowed to offer a voluntary retirement scheme to the employees.
This condition along with the fact that any prospective buyer has to takeover two-thirds of the Rs 48,447 crore debt (as on March 31, 2017) of the airline, has led to a situation where none of the Indian airlines are interested in buying Air India. (We don’t know about the foreign ones as yet).

Newsreports also suggest that the International Finance Corporation, the private investment arm of the World Bank, is likely to underwrite the debt amount of Air India for the successful buyer of Air India.

It is highly unlikely that any prospective buyer will buy Air India without any arrangement to handle the $7.5 billion debt of the airline (Rs 48,447 crore at $1=Rs 65).

Given how risky and difficult the airline business is, such a huge debt amount can pull down even a currently profitable airline. Also, it is worth remembering here that two out of three mergers that happen, fail.

While, the debt part of the airline can be handled, how the government handles the employees of Air India, is more important.

As on January 1, 2017, the airline had 18,049 employees. In comparison, IndiGo had 14,576 employees as on March 31,2017. IndiGo also employed 8,225 employees on a temporary/contractual/casual basis. Indigo has 40% share in India’s domestic airline business and is a profitable airline. Air India has 12% of India’s domestic market share and has a 17% share in flights in and out of India and it loses money.

How do things look at the employee cost level? The employee benefit expenses of Air India during 2016-2017, stood at Rs 2,558 crore. This worked out to around 11.5% of the total revenue earned during the course of the year.

In comparison, Indigo spent Rs 2,048 crore and this worked out to around 10.6% of the total revenue earned by the airline during the course of the year. Clearly, the employee cost is much more in case of Air India.

Having said that, the difference is not much but can nevertheless be important in a low margin business like airlines are. For any prospective buyer of Air India, one of the easiest ways to control costs, is to get rid of the non-productive part of the employee base.

And any prospective buyer having paid good money to the government would want to employ this strategy. This is a low-hanging fruit, but the current terms of sale don’t allow a prospective buyer to do that.

But such a situation is likely to arise only if the government is able to sell Air India.

Before that, the employee unions are likely to show their nuisance value by making it as difficult as possible for the government to sell Air India. The social media campaign is
just the starting point. The opposition parties are likely to join in as well.

The Congress politician Manish Tewari recently tweeted about what happens if British Airways buys Air India. He went on to ask, “won’t souls won’t souls of millions of Freedom Fighters who sacrificed everything turn in their graves?

This is terribly bad rhetoric, given that British Airways was privatised way back in 1987, but then the Congress party has always liked the idea of the government owning public sector enterprises (This is not to say that the Bhartiya Janata Party doesn’t). The British Airways is just another private airline now and one of the most successful privatisations ever carried out in Britain. So, if British Airways buys Air India, it will be a great thing because the airline has some experience in turning around a government owned airline, and running it profitably over the years.

As far as the employees are concerned, their protests are hardly surprising given that most of them have spent their lifetimes working for a government owned company. The future is unlikely to be as cozy as it is under the current owner and they will make every effort possible to ensure that continues.

But the current owner has spent a lot of taxpayer money to keep this airline going. Between April 2010 and December 2017, the accumulated losses of the airline were at Rs 46,256 crore.

To keep the airline going, the government invested Rs 26,545 crore into the airline since April 2011. Over and above this, the airline has taken on working capital loans from banks, which as on March 31, 2017, stood at Rs 31,088 crore. This basically means that the airline keeps running because of the loans it keeps taking on. The banks are lending to the airline primarily because it is owned by the government, leading to the actual debt of the government going up. They would have long-stopped lending to a privately owned airline in a similar situation.

The larger point being that every extra rupee that the government spends on this airline, is a rupee taken away from something else. Let’s take the case of defence. In fact, Vice Chief of Army Lt Gen Sarath Chand told a Parliamentary panel sometime back that 68 per cent of the Army’s equipment is in the ‘vintage category’. “Funds allocated is insufficient and the Army is finding it difficult to even stock arms, ammunition, spares for a 10-day intensive war. All the three services are expected to be prepared for at least 10 days of intense battle,” he said. This is clearly not a good trend. There are more important
things that India needs to spend money on than Air India.

Also, if the government is serious about genuine privatisation (and not the kind where LIC buys government’s stake in public sector enterprises) of loss making as well as profitable government companies, it is important that the sale of Air India goes through.

If the 18,049 employees of Air India are allowed to hold the country to ransom then so will the employees of other loss-making government-owned companies like MTNL, BSNL and a whole host of other companies, in the days to come.

If the government doesn’t handle the employees of Air India seriously, then the entire idea of selling Air India, was yet another jumla to come out of this government.

This originally appeared on Firstpost on April 16, 2018.

For their size, Public Sector Banks Have Had Fewer Frauds Than Private Sector Ones.

 

rupee

A lot has been written on the jeweller Nirav Modi defrauding Punjab National Bank to the tune of $1.8 billion (or Rs 11,400 crore). One line of thought that has been pursued is that of the difference between the public sector banks and the private sector banks.

The logic offered here is that frauds happen only in public sector banks and not private sector banks. And even if they happen at private sector banks, the taxpayer does not pick up the tab. The taxpayer did pick up the tab when the private Global Trust Bank went belly up and had to be merged with the Oriental Bank of Commerce. If the bank is big enough and is going bust, the government has to ultimately come to the rescue, irrespective of whether it is privately owned or government owned. No bank of any significant size can be allowed to go bust.

Now let’s look at the first point I raised, whether public sector banks are defrauded more?

In a recent answer to a question raised in the Lok Sabha, the ministry of finance pointed out that between 2014-2015 and 2016-2017, the total number of bank frauds were 12,778.
Of these 8,622 frauds happened in public sector banks and the remaining 4,156 at private sector banks. The ratio of the total number of frauds at public sector banks to the total number of frauds at private sector banks is 2.07.

The ratio of the average assets of public sector banks to the average assets of private sector banks, between 2014-2015 and 2016-2017, is 2.95. If the ratio of frauds between the two types of banks were to be the same at 2.95, the total number of frauds at public sector banks would have amounted to 12,260 (4,156 multiplied by 2.95). This is not the case. The number of frauds is significantly lower than that. Hence, this basically means that public sector banks are having fewer frauds in terms of their size in comparison to their private sector counterparts in India.

Having said that what is true about public sector banks in general may not necessarily be true for the Punjab National Bank in particular. Punjab National Bank is the second largest public sector bank in the country. As of March 31, 2017, it had total assets worth Rs 7,20,331 crore.

In July 2017, the ministry of finance had provided some very interesting data points with regard to bank frauds. Between 2012-2013 and 2016-2017, a period of five years, the Punjab National Bank faced 942 bank frauds with losses amounting to Rs 8,999 crore.
The only other public sector bank bigger than Punjab National Bank, is the State of Bank of India. As of March 31, 2017, it had assets worth Rs 33,23,191 crore, making it significantly bigger than the Punjab National Bank.

Between 2012-2013 and 2016-2017, the State Bank of India, faced 2,786 frauds with losses amounting to Rs 6,228 crore. Even though the State Bank of India faced more frauds, its total losses were 30.8% lower than that of Punjab National Bank.

Further, of the 78 banks that data was offered on, the Punjab National Bank faced the highest losses due to frauds. It’s average loss on a fraud was also three times the overall average loss on a fraud.

This tells us very clearly that the control systems at the Punjab National Bank were weaker than in comparison to the other banks, and that allowed bigger frauds to happen. In comparison, other banks were placed better than Punjab National Bank. Does this mean that if the bank had better control systems, Nirav Modi wouldn’t have been able to defraud the bank, to the extent that he did? On that your guess is as good as mine.

The column originally appeared on Firstpost on February 20, 2018.

The Old-New Investment Lessons from the Recent Stock Market Crash

bullfighting
It took the BSE Sensex, India’s premier stock market index, a period of nine months (from late April 2017 to late January 2018), to go from 30,000 points to higher than 36,000 points. This meant a return of more than 20% in a period of just nine months.

In an era when fixed deposits give a post-tax return of 5% per year, a return of 20% in less than a year, has to be fantastic. Of course, there are many listed stocks which have given more than 20 % returns, during the same period.

Between January 29 and February 6, 2018, the BSE Sensex has fallen by around 5.8% and wiped out one-third of the gain between April 2017 and January 2018. A week’s fall has wiped off one-third of the gain over a period of nine months.

When the stock market falls, a new set of investors learn, the same set of lessons all over again. What does this mean?

The price to earnings ratio of the BSE Sensex crossed 26 in late January 2018. This basically means that an investor was willing to pay Rs 26 for every one rupee of earning for the stocks that make up the Sensex.

Between April 2017 and January 2018, the price to earnings ratio of the Sensex had moved from 22.6 to 26.4. This meant that while the price of the stocks kept going up, the profit of the companies they represent, did not move at the same speed. Ultimately, the price of a stock is a reflection of the profit that a company is expected to make.

The price to earnings ratio of NSE Nifty touched 27 in late January 2018. The midcap stocks were going at a price to earnings ratio of 50. And the small caps had touched a price to earnings ratio of 120.

Such price to earnings ratios, or what the stock market likes to call valuation, were last seen in 2000 and 2008. With the benefit of hindsight, we now know that at both these points of time, the stock market was in a bubbly territory.

In fact, all the occasions when the price to earnings ratio of the stock market was greater than in the recent past, were either between January and March 2000, when the dotcom bubble and the Ketan Parekh stock market scam were at their peak, or between December 2007 and January 2008, when the stock market peaked, before the financial crisis which finally led to many Wall Street financial institutions going more or less bust, broke out.

Nevertheless, the stock market experts told us that this time is different because there was no bubble in the United States of the kind we saw in 2000 or that the financial crisis that broke out in 2008, was a thing of the past. Hence, there was no real reason for the stock market to fall. (Of course, to these experts, the lack of earnings growth did not matter).

The trouble is that when the markets are in bubbly territory, there typically is no reason for them to fall, until some reason comes along. The first reason came in the form of the finance minister Arun Jaitley, introducing a long-term capital gains tax of 10% on stocks and equity mutual funds. This tax will have to be paid on capital gains of more than Rs 1 lakh, starting from April 1, 2018.

Investors took some time to digest this, and the stock market fell by 2.3%, a day after the budget. If this wasn’t enough, the yield on the 10-year treasury bond of the American government came back into the focus.

This yield jumped by around 40 basis points to 2.85%, in a month’s time. This yield sets the benchmark interest rates for a lot of other borrowing that takes place. In the aftermath of the financial crisis that broke out in September 2008, the central banks of the Western world, led by the Federal Reserve of the United States, printed a lot of money to drive down interest rates.

This was done in the hope of people borrowing and spending money and the economies recovering. That did not happen to the extent it was expected. What happened instead was that large financial institutions borrowed money at low rates and invested them in stock markets all across the world. This phenomenon came to be known as the dollar carry trade.

All this money flowing in drove up stock prices. The problem is that as the 10-year treasury bond yield approaches 3 %, dollar carry trade will become unviable in many cases. Given this, many carry trade investors are now selling out of stock markets, including that of India.

The larger point here is that nobody exactly knows when the stock market will reverse. The way the market has behaved over the last few days, has proved that all over again.

The sellers are not selling out because the valuations are too high (they were too high even a month or two back). They are selling out because of an entirely different reason all together; investors are selling out because they are seeing other investors selling out. The herd mentality that guides investors to buy stocks when everyone else is, also forces them to sell when everyone else is.

Also, the stock market, when it falls can fall very quickly. The last generation of stock market investors learnt this when the BSE Sensex fell by close to 60 % between January 9, 2008 and October 27, 2008.

Is it time for this generation of stock market investors to learn the same lesson all over again? On that your guess is as good as mine.

Stay tuned!

The column originally appeared on Firstpost on Feb 6, 2018.

Economic Survey 2018: It is confirmed; this bull market has seen lower number of bakras

The Economic Survey along with being a good commentary on the state of the economy, also has some very interesting data points. One of the data points in the latest Economic Survey which was released yesterday, concerns the current bull run in the stock market.

The law of demand in economics basically states that at lower price levels, the demand is more. But this doesn’t seem to work for the stock market. Money comes pouring into shares, only after they have rallied a bit. This can easily be seen in the kind of money that has been invested into equity mutual funds during the course of this financial year.

Equity mutual funds largely invest in shares. Between April and December 2017, Rs 1,25,712 crore has been invested (net investment) into equity mutual funds. This is the highest amount of money that has ever been invested in equity mutual funds, during the course of any financial year, and the current financial year ends only in March 2018. 

As the overall stock market has gone higher and higher, more money has come into it. Other than mutual funds, public and private offerings of shares by companies, also tend to blossom when the stock market is doing well. It allows companies to sell their shares, at higher prices than they would be able to manage at any other point of time. This incentive motivates more and more companies to sell their shares, which get lapped up by the stock market investors.

The following table shows the total amount of money raised by companies through the sale of shares.

graph

 

Take a look at the above Table. Rs 1,52,919 crore has been raised by firms between April 2017 and November 2017, by selling their shares, during this financial year. In absolute terms, it remains the highest amount of money ever raised by companies by selling shares. The next best year was 2007-2008, when companies managed to raise Rs 1,40,844 crore, through the sale of shares.

Nevertheless, this does not take into account the fact that the Indian economy in 2017-2018 is significantly bigger than it was in 2007-2008. Hence, the capacity of the companies to raise money by selling shares, is also significantly more than it was ten years back.

How do things stack up when we look at the money raised by companies by selling shares as a proportion to the overall size of the Indian economy (the gross domestic product (GDP)). Take a look at the next Figure.

graph1

 

The ratio of the total amount of money raised by companies through the sale of shares to the gross domestic product, was higher in 2007-2008 than 2017-2018. As a size of the economy, companies raised more money ten years back than they have managed to do during this financial year. As we can see from the above Figure, the total money raised through the sale of shares was around 2.8 percent of the GDP, in 2007-2008. In 2017-2018, this was at around 1.5 per cent. (Look at the left axis of the figure).

Given that a lot of money raised through the sale of shares in 2007-2008 and even in 2017-2018, was and has been raised at very high prices (look at the red line in the above figure which maps the price to earnings ratio), many new investors who venture into the stock market very late in the game, tend to be made bakras in the process. They lose money on their investments.

The good thing is that during this bull run, the proportion of bakras given the increased size of the Indian economy, has been lower than was the case in 2007-2008. At least, that is what the Economic Survey data seems to suggest.

The column was originally published on January 30, 2018, on Firstpost. 

Personal income tax comes to Narendra Modi govt’s rescue as corporate tax falls

Earlier this week, the government released some interesting data on direct taxes which essentially are composed of corporate taxes, personal income tax. They also include tax collected through the income tax amnesty schemes launched by the governments over the years.

How have these taxes done over the years? Has the Narendra Modi government managed to collect more direct taxes than the earlier government’s (as is often said)? The recently released data provides the answers.

Take a look at Figure 1. It basically plots the direct taxes to the GDP ratio over the years.

Figure 1:

Tax to GDP

Source: http://www.incometaxindia.gov.in/Documents/Direct%20Tax%20Data/Time-Series-Data-2016-17.pdf

 

What does Figure 1 tell us? It tells us very clearly that the direct taxes collection as a proportion of the GDP, has remained flat over the last few years, including the three years of the Modi government. It also tells us very clearly that whenever a politician talks about the collection of direct taxes (or for that matter any other tax) going up, it should be in the context of the size of the economy (i.e. the GDP).

If that is not the case, then he or she is clearly bluffing or does not understand how taxes are reported. As I said earlier, the direct taxes are comprised of personal income tax, corporate tax and other direct taxes. First and foremost, let’s take a look at how things look if we ignore the other direct taxes. This is important for the year 2016-2017, when the government managed to collect a significant amount of tax, through two income-tax amnesty schemes, one launched before demonetisation, and one after it.

Figure 2:

Net direct tax

Source: Author calculations based on data taken from http://www.incometaxindia.gov.in/Documents/Direct%20Tax%20Data/Time-Series-Data-2016-17.pdf

Unlike Figure 1, which curves up at the end, Figure 2 is more flattish, once we adjust for the other direct tax. This matters in a year like 2016-2017, when the government collected Rs 15,624 crore as other direct tax, much of which was collected from income tax amnesty schemes. Once adjusted for this, the direct taxes to GDP ratio in 2016-2017 falls to 5.49 percent. In 2015-2016, it was at 5.46 percent of the GDP. This is much lower than the 6.30 percent achieved in 2007-2008. Hence, the direct taxes to GDP ratio has fallen over the years.

It is important to take a look at how does the situation look for corporate tax and personal income tax, as a proportion of the GDP, the two most important constituents of direct taxes. Let’s take a look at Figure 3, which plots the corporate income tax as a proportion of GDP.

Figure 3:

Corp tax

Source: Author calculations based on data taken from http://www.incometaxindia.gov.in/Documents/Direct%20Tax%20Data/Time-Series-Data-2016-17.pdf

Figure 3 tell us very clearly that corporate income tax to GDP ratio has been falling over the years. It has fallen from a peak of 3.88 percent of the GDP in 2007-2008 to 3.19 percent in 2016-2017. One reason for this has been the slow growth in corporate earnings over the last few years. Finance Minister Arun Jaitley has talked about lowering corporate income tax rates, but that hasn’t really happened. Whether lower taxes lead to higher collections remains to be seen.

Now let’s take a look at Figure 4, which plots to the personal income tax to GDP ratio.

Figure 4:

personal tax

Source: Author Calculations based on data taken from http://www.incometaxindia.gov.in/Documents/Direct%20Tax%20Data/Time-Series-Data-2016-17.pdf

Figure 4 makes for an interesting reading. While, personal income tax to GDP ratio like the corporate tax to GDP ratio also fell, it has managed to recover over the years. Basically, the loss of income tax from the corporates has been covered by getting individuals to pay more income tax, on the whole. One reason for this lies in the fact that the number of individual assessees have risen at a much faster rate over the years, than the number of corporate assessees. And this jump has basically ensured that the tax collections of the Narendra Modi government have continued to remain flat. They would have fallen otherwise.

The column originally appeared on Firstpost on December 21, 2017.

Demonetisation’s negative impact on economy is not done yet, it will continue; be warned

rupee
In a few days, the first anniversary of demonetisation will be here. The Narendra Modi government will continue doing what it has done in the last one year—give demonetisation a positive spin.

But how can a decision which made 86.4 per cent of the currency in circulation, useless overnight, in a country where 80-98 per cent of the transactions were carried out in cash (depending on which estimate you would like to believe), be a positive one?

Let’s take a look at Figure 1. It basically plots the annual growth in non-oil non-gold non-silver imports.

Figure 1:
Vivek story chary1

What does Figure 1 tell us? First, it tells us that the annual growth in non-oil non-gold non-silver imports had been rather subdued since January 2015. In fact, it has been in the negative territory several times, especially in a few months before November 2016, when demonetisation was announced.

But after November 2016, the growth in non-oil non-gold non-silver imports simply took off and reached a peak of 42.5 per cent in April 2017. This basically means that these imports where 42.5 per cent higher in April 2017 in comparison to April 2016.

What does this tell us? It tells us that a significant portion of the consumer demand post demonetisation has been fulfilled through higher imports. So far so good.

Demonetisation basically disrupted and destroyed supply chains, both in the formal as well as the informal economy. With supply chains being destroyed, the supply of domestic goods has been replaced by imports and has not been fulfilled through the production of domestic firms.

It is worth remembering here that imports are a negative entry into the gross domestic product (GDP) formula.
Y = GDP
C = Private Consumption Expenditure
I = Investment
G = Government Expenditure
NX = Exports minus imports

Hence, if imports grow at a faster pace than exports, they pull down the GDP to that extent. Exports during this year (between April to September) have gone up by around 10.9 per cent in comparison to last year. Imports are up by 22.3 per cent. Given this, it is not surprising that the economy has slowed down. The economic growth for the non-government part of the economy, which forms around 90 per cent of the economy, was around 4.3 per cent, for the period between April to June 2017. This was more than 9 per cent in early 2016.

Hence, demonetisation has played a huge role in slowing down economic growth. And this is tragic given that one million Indians are entering the workforce every month. In fact, it has also rendered a standard tactic in reviving economic growth, pretty much useless.

Allow me to explain. When countries are not doing well on the economic front, the standard prescription offered by economists is for the government to spend more. When the government spends more, the extra spending becomes somebody’s income. When that income is spent, businesses benefit, and the economy revives.

The trouble is that in the current situation if such a prescription is applied on India (actually to some extent it already has been), the government spending will eventually create consumer demand, a substantial portion of which will be fulfilled through imports. Imports, as we have already seen, are a negative entry into the GDP formula. Given this, a fiscal expansion instead (the act of government spending more) of creating faster economic growth might just slow it down.

The point being that we aren’t done yet with the negative effects of demonetisation. There’s more to come.

The column originally appeared on Firstpost on November 3, 2017.