The Bank Ponzi Scheme

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Every six months the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) publishes a document titled the Financial Stability Report . In the December 2011 report, it pointed out that at 55 per cent, loans to the power sector constituted a major part of the lending to the infrastructure sector. It further said that restructured loans in the power sector were on their way up.

Restructured loans are essentially loans where the borrower has been given a moratorium during which he does not have to repay the principal amount. In some cases, even the interest need not be paid. In some other cases, the tenure of the loan has been increased.

This was nearly five and a half years back, and the first time the RBI admitted that there was a problem in the bank lending to the power sector. In the December 2012 report, the RBI said: “There are also early signs of corporate leverage rising among the several industrial groups with large exposure to infrastructure sectors like power.”

When translated into simple English this basically means that many big industrial groups which had taken on loans to finance power projects had borrowed more money than they would be in a position to repay.

In the years to come by, other sectors along with the power sector also became a part of the RBI commentary on loans which were likely not to be repaid in the future. In the June 2013 report, the central bank said: “Within the industrial sector, a few sub-sectors, namely; Iron & Steel, Textile, Infrastructure, Power generation and Telecommunications; have become a cause of concern.”

In the December 2013 report, the RBI said: “There are five sectors, namely, Infrastructure [of which power is a part], Iron & Steel, Textiles, Aviation and Mining which have high level of stressed advances. At system level, these five sectors together contribute around 24 percent of total advances of scheduled commercial banks, and account for around 51 per cent of their total stressed advances.”

Dear Reader, the point I am trying to make here is that the RBI knew about a crisis brewing in the industrial sector as a whole, and power and steel sector in particular, for a while. In fact, in the June 2015 report, the RBI pointed out: “the debt servicing ability of power generation companies [which are a part of the infrastructure sector] in the near term may continue to remain weak given the high leverage and weak cash flows.”

The funny thing is that while the RBI was putting out these warnings, the banks were simply ignoring them and lending more to these sectors. Between July 2014 and July 2015, banks gave out Rs 86,500 crore, or 71.5 per cent, of the Rs. 1,20,900 crore that they had lent to industry to the two most troubled sectors, namely, power and iron and steel.

What was happening here? The banks were giving new loans to the troubled companies who were not in a position to repay their debt. These new loans were being used by companies to pay off their old loans. A perfect Ponzi scheme if ever there was one. If the banks hadn’t given fresh loans, many of the companies in the power and the iron and steel sectors would have defaulted on their loans.

Hence, the banks gave these companies fresh loans in order to ensure that their loans didn’t turn into bad loans, and so, in the process, they managed to kick the can down the road. In the process, the loans outstanding to these companies grew and if they were not in a position to repay their loans 2-3 years back, there is no way they would be in a position to repay their loan now.

Many of these projects, as Raghuram Rajan put it in a November 2014 speech, “were structured up front with too little equity, sometimes borrowed by the promoter from elsewhere. And some promoters find ways to take out the equity as soon as the project gets going, so there really is no cushion when bad times hit.”

The corporates brought in too little of their own money into the project, and banks ended up over lending. Over lending also happened because many promoters in these sectors were basically crony capitalists close to politicians to whom banks couldn’t say no to.

Over and above this, the steel producers had to face falling steel prices as China dumped steel internationally. In case of power producers, plant load factors (actual electricity being produced as a proportion of total capacity) fell. Along with this, the spot prices of electricity also fell. This did not allow these companies to set high tariffs for power, required for them to generate enough money to repay loans.

All these reasons basically led to the Indian banks ending up in a mess, on the loans it gave to power and iron and steel prices.

The RBI has now put 12 stressed loan cases under the Insolvency Bankruptcy Code, in the hope of recovering bad loans from these companies. Not surprisingly, steel companies dominate the list.

The column originally appeared in the Daily News and Analysis on June 23, 2017.

 

Luck, Skill or Something Else?

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This is that time of the year when various examination results get published. And I happen to be in Delhi, where my parents and a bulk of my relatives live. So, I have been listening to a few interesting stories around examination results.

More than the individuals writing the exams, it is interesting to see how their parents react, once the results are out. If a child does well, it is always because of his hard work and the adjustment his or her parents had to make in order to ensure that he or she could totally concentrate on studies.

If a child doesn’t do well, then it is almost always because circumstances beyond their control. Excuses start to spring up. Here are a few that I have heard over the years: He or she wasn’t keeping well through the period of the examination; there was a power cut the night before the Maths exam and he couldn’t do well; the invigilator took away his paper five minutes before the time got over (this seems to be a favourite with parents).

As Robert H. Frank writes in Success and Luck—Good Fortune and the Myth of Meritocracy: “[A] disconnect between evidence and belief is people’s tendency to underestimate good fortune’s role in success, while being too quick to embrace bad luck as an explanation of failure… People want to feel good about themselves, and they’re more likely to enjoy the warm glow of a positive self-image if they think of themselves as highly competent and attribute their failures to events beyond their control.”

But the point is that luck plays a role both ways—in success as well as failure in exams, even though we like to bring only bad luck into the picture. Let me share a few personal examples here even though it has been a long time since I wrote an exam.
When I was doing my MBA, there were two papers, Macroeconomics and Microeconomics, which were deemed to be the toughest of the lot. As luck would have it, I never got around to studying either of the subjects but passed both of them.

How did that happen? Before the Microeconomics exam, a friend took pity and taught me one chapter 30 minutes before the exam. A bulk of the questions came from that chapter. I scored all of them correctly and got more than the required 50 per cent. Hence, luck played a huge role there.

Luck, in the form of bad luck, also played a huge role for many of my friends who had studied everything else but missed out on that particular chapter.

When it came to macroeconomics, due to some organisational hassles, there was a holiday of four days before the exams. And that was enough for me to read large sections of the prescribed text book and pass the exam. Without the holidays, there was no way I could have passed the exam by just studying overnight.

These were two examples from my end. But all of us have such lucky streaks when we write exams over a long period of time from our childhood till our early twenties.
The issue is how should parents approach this. Should they tell their children about the role of luck? Or should they keep harping on the benefits of hard work? Or should they take the middle path, and tell their children that while hard work is important, luck has a huge role to play as well? And if they do this, will the children be able to understand this?

As Frank writes: “Parents who teach their children that luck doesn’t matter may for that every reason be more than likely to raise successful children than parents who tell their children the truth. When the going gets tough, as it inevitably does along almost every career path, someone who’s keenly sensitive to luck’s importance may be more tempted just to sit back and see what happens.” And no parent would want that to happen.

The column was originally published in the Bangalore Mirror/Mumbai Mirror/Pune Mirror on June 21, 2017.

When Media Covers Economics, Simple Becomes Simplistic

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If front pages of the so-called national newspapers published out of Delhi are to be believed, all is not well between the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) and the ministry of finance. The ministry of finance wants the RBI to cut interest rates and the RBI is not in the mood to do so.

The impression that is created by such newsreports is that interest rates are holding back economic growth. If interest rates were to be cut, consumers would borrow and spend more, and at the same time corporates would borrow more and expand their businesses.
This sounds very simple and straightforward. As Julia Shaw writes in The Memory Illusion: “For our work to carry significance, we must be able to explain it simply.”

Nowhere, does this apply more than in the media, be it newspapers, websites or television. The effort is always to make things as readable and as understandable as possible for the audience.

In doing so, the nuances get lost. While the idea is to make things simple, they end up becoming simplistic. As Shaw writes: “When I explain concepts by using analogies, stories or simplifications, I always risk losing some of the nuances of the inherently complex issues under discussion.”

Lower interest rates leading to greater lending and in turn economic growth is one such thing. Since the beginning of January 2015, interest rates have been on their way down, but that hasn’t led to increased lending, as theoretically it should have.

In 2016-2017, the total fresh lending carried out by banks stood at 44 per cent of the total fresh lending carried out by banks in 2015-2016. This, even though interest rates at which banks lent in 2016-2017 were lower than the interest rates in 2015-2016.
So, what happened here? Bank lending to corporates contracted in 2016-2017.

This basically means that overall, banks did not make any fresh loans to corporates in 2016-2017. Corporates have defaulted on a significant portion of the bank loans they had taken on in the past. Given this, banks are not in the mood to lend to corporates.

Over and above this, the good corporates who have not defaulted on loans and are in a position to repay, are not in a mood to borrow from banks. In some cases, this is because there are other cheaper modes of finance available. And in some other cases, this is because of the simple fact that the current operations of the corporates are producing enough to meet the market demand. Hence, lower interest rates do not help. Corporates borrow when there is a need to borrow.

Now take the case of home loans. Between 2014-2015 and 2015-2016, fresh home loans given by banks fell by around 10 per cent. This jumped up by more than 25 per cent between 2015-2016 and 2016-2017. What happened here? Of course, lower interest rates helped to some extent. But what also helped where the government sops on home loan interest rates, as well as falling real estate prices in large parts of the country.

All this nuance goes missing, when an impression is created that lower interest rates lead to greater borrowing, which in turn leads to higher economic growth. As we have seen here that is clearly is not the case. As John Kenneth Galbraith points out in The Economics of Innocent Fraud: “Business firms borrow when they can make money and not because interest rates are low.”

Along similar lines, individuals borrow when they feel confident of being able to repay the EMI. This is not to say that lower interest rates do not lead to increased borrowing, but the truth is not as simple as that.

Also, none of these newsreports, bother to take into account the fact that people save a lot of their money using fixed deposits. And if interest rates on fixed deposits go down, it impacts the savings plans of many people. What about that?

The piece originally appeared in the Bangalore Mirror on June 14, 2017

Why Bangalore Came Last in IPL

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The Indian Premier League(IPL) is just about to come to an end. The Bangalore team did not do particularly well in this year’s edition and won only three out of their 14 games. They lost 10 games and one game was drawn because of rains.

The team was a finalist last year and lost to Hyderabad in the final. Given this, at the beginning of the 2017 season, nobody expected that the Bangalore team would come last among the 8 teams. Nevertheless, reasons are now being offered on why the Bangalore team did not do well this time around.

While analysing and offering reasons is fine, some of the cricket experts are now saying that they always knew that Bangalore wouldn’t do well this year. Multiple reasons have been offered. Here are a few that I have heard.

The captain Virat Kohli was injured and missed the first few games. KL Rahul missed the entire tournament because of an injury. Chris Gayle was not in his usual form. AB de Villiers was also injured and came in only after the first few games. One expert even said that the injury to batsman Sarfaraz Khan hit the team hard.  And hence, the team was never able to build the momentum that is required to keep winning T20 games.

While all this sounds fine, none of these reasons were offered at the beginning of the tournament. At the beginning of the tournament none of the experts said that they don’t expect the Bangalore team to do well this year. But now once the Bangalore team has not done well, they are busy coming up with various reasons to explain the non-performance.

And along with that they are convinced about the fact that they had always believed that the Bangalore team would not do well this year. As David Hand writes in The Improbability Principle: “After the fact, it’s easy to put the pieces together, and show how they form a continuous chain leading to the outcome.” Or to put it simply, everything is obvious once you know the answer. Hence, Bangalore did not do well because Kohli was injured and could not play in the first few games. Bangalore did not do well in these games and in the process, they were never able to build the required momentum which is an essential part of a tournament of this kind.

This kind of storyline could not have been offered at the beginning of the tournament. As Hand writes: “Before the fact, however, there are many pieces and potential chains and it’s just not possible to know which events fit together. This isn’t because there are too many pieces, but simply because they can be put together in a vast number of possible ways, and there’s no reason to select any one of them.”

Hence, before this year’s IPL started one did not know that Chris Gayle, the master of the T20 game, would have the kind of disastrous year he did. It was always difficult to predict that the likes of de Villiers, Travis Head and Shane Watson, brilliant T20 players in their own right, wouldn’t have much of an impact on Bangalore’s overall performance. Even Kedhar Jadhav burdened with the  responsibility to keep wickets, looked out of touch.

But all this and more can be now said with confidence, almost at the end of the tournament. As Hand writes: “Our innate tendency to retrospectively adjust a new recollection as new information becomes available, to identify the chain which led to the disaster and to say, after the fact, ‘Look, it was staring us in the face!’ is called hindisight bias.”

The point being that Bangalore lost because they did not score enough runs and they did not take enough wickets. Any analysis beyond this, is essentially hindsight bias.

The column originally appeared in the Bangalore Mirror on May 17, 2017

RERA: There’s no way home prices will go up anytime soon

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The Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (RERA), came into force on May 1, 2017. After this those who make their living in the real estate industry have been suggesting that real estate prices will go up in the days to come.

The logic being offered is that this will be because of compliance costs of RERA which the buyers will ultimately have to pay for.

Given that India does not have any data which agglomerates real estate prices at the country level, those connected with the real estate industry can get away with such statements, because no one else has any idea anyway.

Data from PropEquity Research shows that unsold home inventories stood at close to 4.72 lakh units in the top eight cities across India, as on March 31, 2017. These are homes that have been built but not been sold.

During the period January to March 2017, the inventory of unsold homes came down by 3.12 per cent. Despite this fall, the unsold inventory overhang continues to be huge, across the country. Data from PropEquity suggests that overhang is 60 months in Noida, 43 months in Mumbai, 38 months in Chennai and 30 months in Bengaluru.

If this unsold inventory has to be sold, the home-prices cannot go up from where they are, RERA notwithstanding. The fact that so much inventory has accumulated in the first place tells us very clearly that people are not buying homes to begin with. The only reason for this is that homes across urban India are fairly expensive in comparison to the capacity of people to pay.

This is obvious from the rental yield (annual rent divided by the market price of the home). Typically, the rental yield currently varies between 1.5-2 per cent. This basically means that in order to buy a home right now, one has to pay 50 to 67 times the annual rent. This tells us very clearly that it makes more sense to rent a home and at the same time that home-prices are very expensive. Of course, rental housing comes with its own set of issues in India, with insecure landlords being the biggest one.

Data from PropEquity suggests that property prices fell by 1.7 per cent for January to March 2017. This is clearly not enough. If this inventory overhang has to clear, prices need to fall further. What will force the builder’s hand further is that with RERA in place, new launches to raise finance for previously delayed projects or to pay off debt, will not so be easy, anymore.

A careful look at home loan data of 2016-2017 also suggests that home-prices have fallen.

In 2015-2016, only 16.8 per cent of the home loans given by banks were given to the priority sector. A housing loan of up to Rs 28 lakh in a city with a population of 10 lakh or more, which finances the purchase of a home with a price of up to Rs 35 lakh, is categorised as a priority sector housing loan.

In 2016-2017, 23 per cent of the home loans given by banks were given to the priority sector. This basically means that banks are giving out more sub Rs 28 lakh home loans for financing more homes worth less than Rs 35 lakh, than they were in the past.

This basically means that home-prices have either come down or builders are building more of sub Rs 35 lakh homes. Either ways, this is a good trend. It is not so obvious given that no agency agglomerates real estate prices in India at a national level. But the home loan data from banks clearly suggests this.

Last week, Keki Mistry, the bossman at HDFC, the largest housing finance company in the country suggested that given the low interest rates and the time correction of prices that has happened, it is a good time to buy a house.

Of course, for a home loan lender, it is always a good time to buy a house. What does Mistry mean by time correction of prices? He basically means that even though home-prices haven’t fallen much in absolute terms, they have fallen once we adjust for inflation.

It is worth re-stating here that if the builders have to sell off their unsold inventory of homes, they need to cut prices. Even if they manage to hold on to the current prices, they will not be in a position to increase prices, over the next few years. Hence, the time correction of prices is likely to continue. Given this, those who want a home to live-in and are in a position to continue to wait, should do that.

As far as interest rates are concerned, what Mistry forgot to mention is that home loans have a floating rate of interest, which keeps changing. Hence, over the 15-20 year term of a home loan, interest rates can and will vary. And given this, low interest rates initially, does not make much of a difference in the overall scheme of things. What is needed are lower home-prices.

The column originally appeared on business-standard.com  on May 9, 2017

Why The Real Estate Act Will Remain Ineffective Until The Builder-Politician Nexus Is Broken

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In the first half of Vidhu Vinod Chopra’s 1994 release “1942: A Love Story,” there are a series of characters saying: “Shubhankar Da aane waale hain (Brother Shubhankar is about to come)”. The movie is based around the freedom struggle and the hope every time the lines are said is that the man called Shubhankar will come and set everything right.

Shubhbankar, played by Jackie Shroff, does come, just before the interval shot. Things become messier after his arrival, though eventually, like in all good Hindi films, everybody lives happily ever after.

Dear Reader, you must be wondering why am I talking about a 23-year-old movie which everyone has forgotten about by now, except for its marvellous songs composed by RD Burman.

Well, The Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016, or RERA for short, has come into effect from May 1, 2017.

And it is expected to play the role of Shubhankar in the real estate sector in India. It is expected to come and set everything alright, at least that is the impression that has been given by many real estate experts in the media. But how correct is that?

RERA is basically a central Act. Given this, state governments do not need to pass separate Acts in order to implement it. But land is a state subject and given this the rules needed to implement the Act, need to be formulated and notified by the state governments. Many states are yet to come up with these rules.

As rating agency ICRA points out in a research note: “Except Uttar Pradesh, Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, Orissa, Bihar and the Union Territories, most have missed the deadline to notify its rules under the… Act.”

This tells us how serious the various state governments are about implementing the Act. Over and above this, the RERA mandates that every state set up its own real estate regulator. It so happens that Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra and Rajasthan, are the only states up until now to have set up a real estate regulator. “Certain other states have set up interim regulatory authorities (as permitted under the Act),” ICRA further points out.

Also, as a newsreport in the Mint points out, Maharashtra is the only state that has set up a website where the real estate developers can register to set up new projects under the RERA.

Given that most states haven’t gotten around to setting up the real estate regulator and a website, this is something that will take time as they go around meeting the physical infrastructure and human resources requirements of the regulator as well as the website. And given this, RERA will not actually be implemented across large parts of the country, for some time to come.

Also, states which have formulated the rules to implement the RERA have diluted them in comparison to the rules framed by the union government. Take the case of Gujarat. Only projects launched on or after November 1, 2016, come under the aegis of the Act.

On the other hand, the central government Act defines ongoing projects as projects “for which the completion certificate has not been issued” on the date of commencement of the Act. This essentially allows many projects which are still work in progress not to come under the RERA.

Haryana, another state ruled by a BJP government, has done something along similar lines to help keep ongoing projects outside the ambit of the RERA. Projects which have applied for a part completion certificate or an occupancy certificate will not come under the RERA, if the certificate is granted. This, as was the case in Gujarat, is another ploy to get around the central government Act’s definition of an ongoing project.

In Maharashtra, a new nomenclature called proposed plans has been introduced and proposed plans instead of sanctioned plans can be submitted to the regulator. In the case of RERA only the term sanctioned plans has been used and only sanctioned plans can be submitted to the regulator.

As per the RERA any changes made to the sanctioned plans needs the written consent of allottees in the project. As the bare Act points out: “Any other alterations or additions in the sanctioned plans, layout plans and specifications of the buildings or the common areas within the project without the previous written consent of at least two-thirds of the allottees, other than the promoter, who have agreed to take apartments in such building.”

In case of Maharasthra, the usage of the term proposed plan is basically being seen as a way of getting around the written consent of the two-thirds of the allottees, if the builder goes around making changes to the project.

Over and above this, the Maharashtra rules point out that a phase of a project “may consist of a building or a wing of the building in case of building with multiple wings or defined number of floors in a multi-storeyed building/wing”. This has again been done to give flexibility to the builder to operate in the way he wants to, without following the letter and spirit of RERA. It allows the builders to keep developing projects on a piecemeal basis, something that they excel at.

In Delhi, the rules allow the builder to give details of only those legal cases where courts have already given a deicision. He does not have to provide details of cases which are still on. This directly contradicts Section 4.2 (b) of RERA which essentially states that the builder needs to provide: “a brief detail of the projects launched by him, in the past five years, whether already completed or being developed, as the case may be, including the current status of the said projects, any delay in its completion, details of cases pending, details of type of land and payments pending.”

In the time to come more such dilutions will keep coming out. The trouble right now is that operational rules of all states are not available in English and hence, it’s difficult to get a pan India perspective.

So, the question is why are state governments diluting the implementation of the RERA? The simple answer lies in the fact that there is a nexus between the builders and the state governments. Currently, the regulations governing the real estate sector vary from state to state and are inherently complicated. Given this, anyone wanting to be even a marginally serious player in the real estate business, needs to be in the good books of local politicians. This also explains why there are no pan India real estate companies. Forget pan India, there are no real estate companies which operate through an entire state.

The politicians also see real estate to be a cash cow which helps them generate money to fight elections as well as enrich themselves. This explains why regulations governing the sector continue to be complicated. In many states, the politicians are builders themselves though they have other individuals fronting for them. In such a scenario expecting the RERA to be implemented properly is nothing but day dreaming. For politicians, it makes sense if RERA is not implemented in letter and spirit. Given that politicians benefit from builders, a diluted RERA is their way of a quid pro quo.

If RERA has to be implemented properly the nexus between the politicians and the builders at the state level needs to be broken. And for that to happen, one of the first things that state governments need to do is get rid of change in land usage regulations that are currently in force. Only once this happens will things start to roll.

To conclude, Shubhankar Da may have been effective in 1942—A Love Story, RERA in its current form will become yet another regulation which won’t achieve much.

The column originally appeared on The Huffington Post on May 3, 2017

Now that RERA is a reality, should you buy an under-construction property?

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The Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016, or RERA for short, has come into effect from May 1, 2017.

With this happening, the question on everybody’s lips is, should we buy an under-construction property? If you plan to buy a home to live in, an under-construction property makes sense because it comes cheaper than a finished one. If you plan to buy home as an investment, given that an under-construction property is cheaper, the returns are always better, depending how early in the construction stage you make the investment.

But that it the theoretical part of it. It comes with the assumption that the builder will deliver the property for which you have paid, and he will deliver it on time. The problem is that this does not always turn out to be the case. Many people in the Delhi National Capital Territory region and other parts of the country, have found this out in the last few years.

In the process, they have ended up paying EMIs on the home loans they had taken to fund their home purchase and the rent on the home in which they continue to live in. The homes they had hoped to live in are nowhere in sight.

But all this happened in era when there was no RERA. Now we have RERA. The real estate sector in the country up until now had next to no regulation from the point of view of the buyer. Buying a house required a lot of leap of faith and prayers at the same time.

The RERA essentially has these five basic purposes: a) to make sure that home that has been bought is delivered on time. b) to make sure what has been promised has been delivered with respect to the actual size of the house, the facilities etc. c) to make sure that the money taken from the buyer is used to build what has been promised and is not diverted to something else, as many builders tend to do. They tend to raise money for one project and then use it to finance another project. d) to make sure that the many permissions required to build a housing project are in place. e) to make sure that if any changes are made to the project, they have the approval of the majority of the buyers.

RERA also makes it mandatory for state governments to set up a real estate regulator. As the Act states that: “Any aggrieved person may file a complaint with the Authority [i.e., the real estate regulator of a particular state] or the adjudicating officer, as the case may be, for any violation or contravention of the provisions of this Act.”

What this basically means that if the builder takes the buyer for a ride, he can approach the real estate regulator and hope to set things right. This is precisely why there have been a flood of acche din articles in the media saying how RERA is going to save the day for real estate buyers.

There are multiple problems here:

a) While RERA is a central Act, land is a state subject. Hence, states are allowed to make the operational rules to implement RERA. Given the nexus that prevails between state level politicians and builders, state governments have already started diluting the basic spirit of RERA. In particular, an effort is being made to ensure that the ongoing projects are not brought under the ambit of RERA. This basically means that many buyers who are currently in trouble will not be able to benefit from this Act.

b) Only three states (Maharashtra, Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh) have set up regulators up until now. Hence, the process of setting up a regulator is going to take some time.

c) It is important to understand that regulators don’t start becoming effective from day one. Take the case of the Securities and Exchange Board of India, the stock market regulator. It was set up in 1992 and in 1994 the vanishing companies scam, one of the biggest stock market scams, happened. This was followed by the Ketan Parekh scam in 1999-2000. Hence, it takes time for regulators to mature.

d) Also, it is important to know that the regulators don’t necessarily bat for the consumers. The Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority(IRDA) of India, the insurance regulator, for a very long time, turned a blind eye to all the misselling carried out by the insurance companies. It kept clearing investment plans which worked well for the insurance agents but not for the consumers who had bought them. The point being whether real estate regulators bat for the consumers or the builders, remains to be seen. Also, this is something that may vary from state to state.

To conclude, there are many practical things which continue to remain unclear as of now. Hence, if you are looking to buy a home to live in, it makes sense to still buy a fully finished one, rather than something which is under-construction. This may mean compromising on the size or the location, perhaps, but what you will get in return is peace of mind. And nothing is more important than that.

The column originally appeared on Business Standard The column originally appeared on Business Standard online on May 3, 2017.